Chattanooga

The Chattanooga Campaign consisted of a series of battles and maneuvers. For the purposes of this website the campaign covers the period from 27 April 1863 to 27 November 1863.

 

Major Actions:

27-28 October 1863: Brown's Ferry (Opening of the Cracker Line)

 

28-29 October 1863: Battle of Wauhatchie

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23 November 1863: Battle of Orchard Knob

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24 November 1863: Battle of Lookout Mountain

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25 November 1863: Battle of Missionary Ridge

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27 November 1863: Battle of Ringgold Gap

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In Chattanooga, Rosecrans was stunned by the defeat of his army [at Chickamauga ] and became psychologically unable to take decisive action to lift the siege. President Abraham Lincoln remarked that Rosecrans seemed "confused and stunned like a duck hit on the head." Union soldiers began to feel the effect of extremely short rations and many of their horses and mules died. The only supply line that was not controlled by the Confederates was a roundabout, tortuous course nearly 60 miles long over Walden's Ridge from Bridgeport, Alabama. Heavy rains began to fall in late September, washing away long stretches of the mountain roads. On October 1, Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler's Confederate cavalry intercepted and severely damaged a train of 800 wagons—burning hundreds of the wagons, and shooting or sabering hundreds of mules—at the start of his October 1863 Raid through Tennessee to sever Rosecrans's supply line. Toward the end of October, typical Federal soldiers' rations were "four cakes of hard bread and a quarter pound of pork" every three days.

The Union high command began immediate preparations to relieve the city. Only hours after the defeat at Chickamauga, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton ordered Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker to Chattanooga with 20,000 men in two small corps from the Army of the Potomac in Virginia. Even before the Union defeat, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had been ordered to send his available force to assist Rosecrans, and it departed under his chief subordinate, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, from Vicksburg, Mississippi. On September 29, Stanton ordered Grant to go to Chattanooga himself,  as commander of the newly created Military Division of the Mississippi, bringing all of the territory from the Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River (and much of the state of Arkansas) under a single commander for the first time. Grant was given the option of replacing the demoralized Rosecrans with Thomas. Although Grant did not have good personal relations with Thomas, he had previously determined that he "could not make [Rosecrans] do as I wished" in the capacity as a subordinate. Grant selected Thomas to command the Army of the Cumberland. Hearing an inaccurate report that Rosecrans was preparing to abandon Chattanooga, Grant telegraphed to Thomas, "Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible." The Rock of Chickamauga replied immediately, "I will hold the town till we starve." Grant traveled over the treacherous mountain supply line roads and arrived in Chattanooga on October 23.

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The chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland, Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith, had devised a plan with Rosecrans to open a more reliable supply line to the troops in Chattanooga. General Thomas put the plan afoot immediately upon taking command. Smith briefed Grant immediately after the new commander's arrival and Grant enthusiastically concurred with the plan.

Early on the morning of October 27, Hazen's men floated unnoticed past the Confederate position on Lookout Mountain, aided by low fog and no moonlight. They were able to seize the ground above Brown's Ferry by 4:40 a.m. A counterattack by the 15th Alabama Infantry, commanded by Col. William C. Oates (of Little Round Top fame) was repulsed and Oates was wounded. Oates's brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law, placed his brigade blocking the road over Lookout Mountain and reported the Union success to Longstreet. Longstreet dismissed the importance of the report, considering the Union move to be only a feint, and did not bother passing the information on to Bragg. When Bragg learned of it, he ordered Longstreet to retake the ground immediately, but Longstreet once again did nothing and Smith's men spent the day consolidating their bridgehead without interference.

Hooker's column marched through Lookout Valley and linked up with Hazen and Turchin at Brown's Ferry at 3:45 p.m., October 28. Thomas's staff began the preparations to bring supplies over the Cracker Line and he telegraphed General in Chief Henry W. Halleck that he expected "in a few days to be pretty well supplied."

Grant had no particular expectation for Hooker other than to divert Bragg's attention by ascending to the plateau of Lookout Mountain. Thomas wanted support on his flank, however, and called Hooker to cross the valley and demonstrate against Bragg's left flank directly at the Rossville Gap.  As the morning progressed, Sherman launched multiple direct assaults against Cleburne's line on Tunnel Hill, but despite his significantly larger force, committed only three brigades to the attacks and made no headway. At the southern end of the battlefield, Hooker's advance was slowed for hours by the burned bridges on Chattanooga Creek.

Seeing the lack of progress on the flanks, around 3:30 p.m. Grant ordered Thomas to move forward in the center in accordance with his earlier instructions. The men of the Army of the Cumberland advanced and quickly pushed the Confederates from their rifle pits but were then subjected to a punishing fire from the Confederate positions up the ridge. Most of Thomas's troops had been at the disastrous loss at Chickamauga and had suffered taunts by Sherman's and Hooker's newly arrived forces. Now they were under fire from above with no apparent plan to advance or move back. At this point, the Union soldiers continued the attack against the remaining lines. This second advance was taken up by the commanders on the spot, but also by some of the soldiers who, on their own, sought shelter from the fire further up the slope.[59] Bragg had placed his artillery and trenches of the infantry along the actual crest of the ridge, rather than the military crest, and they were unable to provide effective fire. The Union advance was disorganized but effective, finally overwhelming and scattering what ought to have been an impregnable Confederate line. As such, the Army of the Cumberland's ascent of Missionary Ridge was one of the war's most dramatic events. Military historians Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones contend that the Battle of Missionary Ridge was "the war's most notable example of a frontal assault succeeding against intrenched defenders holding high ground."

Grant was initially furious that his orders to advance only as far as the rifle pits had not been followed exactly. Thomas was taken by surprise as well, knowing that he would be blamed if the assault failed. But it succeeded. By 4:30 p.m. the center of Bragg's line had broken completely and fled in panic, requiring the abandonment of Missionary Ridge and a headlong retreat eastward to South Chickamauga Creek. The sole exception to the panicked flight was Cleburne's command, his division augmented by two brigades from another division, which formed the rearguard of Bragg's army as it retreated eastward.

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